This paper shows that innocent suspects benefit from exercising their right to silence in criminal proceedings. We study a model in which a suspect of a crime can make a statement or remain silent during police interrogation. At trial, the jury observes informative but imperfect signals about the suspect's type and the truthfulness of the suspect's statement. We show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects by providing them with a safer alternative to speech, as well as by reducing the probability of wrongful conviction of suspects who remain silent whether or not a right to silence exists. The paper thus provides a broad utilitarian justification for the argument that a right to silence helps the innocent. * I am grateful to Mat McCubbins for useful comments and suggestions.
Introduction
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination provides criminal suspects with a right to silence. The right to silence prohibits a jury from drawing an adverse inference from a suspect's decision to remain silent in the face of questioning. In particular, if a suspect of a crime refuses to answer police questions, the jury must not consider the suspect's silence as evidence of guilt. Rather, the jury must reach its verdict based only on the other evidence presented at trial.
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The right to silence is often described as one of the fundamental principles of criminal proceedings. Thus, the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona (1966, p. 466) portrayed the right to silence as "the essential mainstay of our adversarial system."
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Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's endorsement of the right to silence, it is constantly debated among policy makers and academics (see, e.g., Coldrey 1991; Greer, 1990) . Advocates of the right to silence concede that it may help the guilty to avoid conviction, but argue that it protects other values such as personal dignity, free will, and deterrence of government coercion (Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 1964; Gerstein, 1970) . Detractors of the right to silence maintain that it impedes the search for truth with no benefit to the innocent. Thus as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, the philosopher Jeremy Bentham wrote in the context of silence at trial: "Innocence claims the right of speaking, as guilt invokes the privilege of silence." (Bentham, 1825; p. 241) . Similarly, Judge Henry Friendly argued that no proof has been offered that the privilege indeed protects the innocent and that "on balance the privilege so much more often shelters the guilty and even harms the innocent that ... its occasional effect in protection of the innocent would be an altogether insufficient reason." (Friendly, 1968; p. 686 ).
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In this paper, we examine the effects of a right to silence on suspects' decisions to speak or to remain silent during police interrogations. 4 We show that, contrary to Bentham's factual assertion, a right to silence helps the innocent by providing them a refuge against self-incrimination. 1 See Dershowitz (2008, chapter 1) for a brief description of the right to silence. 2 Most civil law countries have also adopted rules that require that suspects be informed of the right to silence prior to questioning. 3 The argument that the right to silence lacks merit is common in the legal literature. See, e.g., Dolinko (1986) . 4 Our model applies equally to silence at trial. The decision to testify at trial, however, is also affected by the evidentiary rule which allows the prosecution to introduce the defendant's prior convictions as evidence if the defendant testified at trial.
We also show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects even if they would have chosen to remain silent in the absence of a right to silence. Specifically, we show that the probability of an innocent suspect who remains silent being wrongfully convicted is lower if suspects have a right to silence.
To evaluate the effects of a right to silence on suspects' decision to speak or to remain silent, we consider a strategic game between a suspect and a jury. The suspect is arrested for committing a crime and is either innocent or guilty. The suspect, but not the jury, knows whether or not he committed the crime. The jury only knows the prior probability that the suspect is either innocent or guilty. The suspect is taken in for police interrogation, where he can make a statement (i.e., "speak"), remain silent, or confess the crime.
If the suspect does not confess the crime, the case goes to trial. At trial, the jury observes direct evidence relating to the suspect's guilt. The direct evidence either implicates the suspect in the crime or not. For example, incriminating evidence may be witness testimony or physical object that suggests the suspect committed the crime. The direct evidence is informative but imperfect: it is more likely to incriminate a guilty suspect than an innocent suspect, but may incriminate an innocent suspect and may fail to incriminate a guilty suspect.
Apart from the direct evidence, the jury also observes indirect evidence concerning the truthfulness of the suspect's police statement (if the suspect chose to make such statement). The indirect evidence either verifies or contradicts the suspect's police statement. We assume that the indirect evidence always verifies statements made by some innocent suspects ("clearly innocent suspects"). With respect to other suspects, the indirect evidence is more likely to verify innocent suspects' statements than guilty suspects' statements, but may contradict innocent suspects' statements and verify guilty suspects' statements. Thus, the indirect evidence as well is informative but imperfect. That the indirect evidence may contradict both innocent and guilty suspects' statements implies that innocent and guilty suspects alike face a dilemma of whether to speak or to remain silent. The jury's payoff depends on its verdict and the suspect type. In particular, the jury obtains a payoff of 0 if it acquits (convicts) an innocent (guilty) suspect and a negative payoff if it acquits (convicts) a guilty (suspect). In reaching its verdict, the jury consults both the direct evidence and the indirect evidence. We make a few assumptions about the jury's payoff-maximizing decision given the suspect's decision to speak or to remain silent and the realization of the evidence. First, if only direct evidence is available to the jury, the jury convicts (acquits) the suspect if the evidence incriminates (does not incriminate) the suspect. This assumption reflects the notion that the direct evidence in itself has a probative value. Second, clearly innocent suspects can exonerate themselves with certainty by making a statement. This assumption reflects that notion that, conditional on the clearly innocent suspects always speaking and the indirect evidence verifying the suspect's statement, the jury has a reasonable doubt about the suspect's guiltand therefore maximizes its payoff by acquitting the suspect -irrespective of the realization of the direct evidence. Third, the fact that the clearly innocent suspects always speak implies that a suspect's decision to remain silent might be considered as evidence of guilt in the absence of a right to silence.
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Accordingly we assume that the jury may maximize its payoff by convicting a silent suspect even in the absence of direct evidence concerning the suspect's guilt.
The analysis proceeds by identifying the conditions under which a right to silence alters the equilibrium strategies of innocent and guilty suspects. A right to silence is defined as a constraint imposed on the jury not to convict a silent suspect in the absence of incriminating evidence. We show that a right to silence directly benefits innocent suspects by reducing the probability of wrongful conviction in two distinct circumstances. First, a right to silence provides innocent suspects, who are otherwise compelled to speak, with the alternative of silence. This benefits the innocent suspects if the probability that the indirect evidence contradicts their statements is greater than the probability that the direct evidence incriminates them. Second, a right to silence benefits innocent suspects who would have remained silent even in the absence of a right to silence. Specifically, in the absence of a right to silence, innocent suspects who remain silent are convicted with positive probability even if the direct evidence does not incriminate them. In the presence of a right to silence, by contrast, innocent suspects who remain silent are convicted if and only if the direct evidence incriminates them.
Our model also confirms the argument that innocent suspects indirectly benefit from a right to silence (Seidmann and Stein, 2000; Seidmann, 2005 ). Thus we show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects who choose to speak in the presence of a right to silence because it induces guilty suspects to remain silent, thereby decreasing the probability that innocent suspects whose statements are contradicted by the evidence at trial are wrongfully convicted. This result -in contrast to Seidmann and Stein's argument -does not presuppose that the innocent always have incentives to speak.
Our results hold for low as well as for high premium for confession. When the premium for confession is low, suspects never find it profitable to confess the crime. The introduction of a right to silence, in turn, only affects suspects' decision to speak or to remain silent. If the premium for confession is high, by contrast, guilty suspects find it profitable to (probabilistically) confess the crime. The introduction of a right to silence, in turn, induces guilty suspects to shift from confession to silence. Irrespective of whether the premium for confession is low or how, however, innocent suspects benefit from a right to silence.
Last, a right to silence is socially costly if juries' preferences are aligned with society's. Specifically, if a right to silence affects suspects' equilibrium strategies, then the jury's equilibrium payoff is lower if suspects have a right to silence. As Seidmann (2005) points out, this is because a right to silence prevents the jury from considering information that would otherwise increase the accuracy of the jury's decision. A right to silence may nevertheless be justified as a means of enhancing the protection given to innocent suspects against wrongful conviction. This paper is not the first to suggest that the innocent benefit from exercising the right to silence. The Supreme Court in Ullmann v. United States (1956, p. 426) notes that people "too readily assume that those who invoke [the right to silence] are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege." Schulhofer (1991) suggests that the right to silence protects innocent defendants who cannot offer exonerating evidence from the risk involved in forced testimony. In particular, an innocent defendant might fear that he would appear guilty on the stand after skillful cross-examination: "if an innocent defendant chooses silence, it is because his judgment is that testifying will increases the chances of conviction." (p. 331). In a similar vein, Amar (1997) argues that the 'cruel trilemma' refers to innocent suspects who are forced to testify and concludes that "[a] desire to protect the innocent defendant from erroneous conviction . . . is wholly consistent with the deep structure of our Bill of Rights." However, the argument that the innocent directly benefit from a right to silence has not been studied and illustrated in a formal model.
Related Literature
This paper is related to Seidmann and Stein (2000) and Stein (2005). Seidmann and Stein argue that a right to silence indirectly benefits the innocent by inducing the guilty to remain silent, thereby bolstering the credibility of statements made by the innocent. Underlying this argument is the assumption that innocent suspects always benefit from (or at least, are never harmed by) making an exculpatory statement, for the evidence at trial never contradicts an innocent suspect's statement. 6 Seidmann and Stein accordingly conclude that the main justification for a right to silence lies in the fact that it allows the jury to draw a positive inference from a suspect's decision not to remain silent. This paper shows that, given the possibility that the evidence at trial contradicts their statements, innocent suspects may choose to remain silent in the presence as well as in the absence of a right to silence. By suggesting that innocent suspects directly exercise their right to silence, this paper provides a broader utilitarian justification for a right to silence than is offered by Seidmann and Stein. This justification for a right to silence also avoids the criticism that juries are not likely to respect a right to silence if only the guilty exercise it; for if innocent and guilty alike exercise the right to silence, then juries, if so instructed, can be expected to refrain from drawing an inference of guilt from silence. Moreover, the result that innocent suspects might remain silent in the absence of a right to silence sheds light on the fact that abolishing the right to silence does not cause all suspects to speak. This paper is also related to Mialon (2005) , who examines the effects of a right to silence at trial. Mialon considers a model in which the evidence at trail either incriminates the defendant or exonerates him. The defendant, however, may not know the evidence. If the defendant does not present exonerating evidence, then the jury could rationally infer that the defendant is more likely to be guilty. A right to silence prevents the jury from convicting the defendant upon failure to present exonerating evidence, thus benefiting innocent suspects who cannot provide such evidence. In contrast to the model here, Mialon's model assumes that innocent suspects always have incentives to offer exculpatory evidence. In Mialon's model, therefore, the presence of a right to silence does not affect the innocent's equilibrium strategy, as it does here. This paper builds on the literature on strategic communication. Specifically, the conflict of interest between the informed player (suspect) and the uninformed player (jury) is akin to that in cheap-talk games (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) . The ability of the uninformed player to verify the informed player's message (police statement) is similar to that in communication models with verifiable messages (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) . Unlike the latter models, however, here the uninformed player's verification technology is imperfect in that it consists of informative but imperfect signals on the informed player's message (indirect evidence) and the informed player's type (direct evidence). That the verification technology consists of imperfect signals results in partial unraveling of information.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 examines a no-right-to-silence regime and Section 4 a right-to-silence regime, given that the premium for confession is low. Section 4 concludes by showing that innocent suspects benefit directly (if they remain silent) as well as indirectly (if they speak) from the presence of a right to silence. Section 5 examines the effects of a right to silence when the premium for confession is high so that guilty suspects confess in equilibrium. It shows that a right to silence benefits the innocent in similar ways when the premium for confession is high and when it is low. Section 6 concludes.
Model

Set up
The model follows Seidmann (2005) , but modifies some of Seidmann's assumptions. In period 0, a suspect is arrested for committing a crime. The suspect type, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, is realized with prior probability p t , where t p t = 1. The suspect is either clearly innocent (type 0), innocent (type 1), or guilty (type 2). We will make clear below the difference between these suspect types. The suspect knows his type, but the police and the court cannot observe the suspect's type.
In period 1, in response to police questioning, the suspect can confess the crime, remain silent, or make a statement. The suspect's statement may concern, for example, the whereabouts of the suspect at the time the crime was committed (i.e., an alibi) or whether the suspect was previously acquainted with the crime victim. If the suspect does not confess the crime, the game proceeds to period 2.
In period 2, the case goes to trial and evidence is presented to a jury. In period 3, after consulting the evidence, the jury decides whether to convict or acquit the suspect.
Evidence
The evidence at trail consists of direct evidence and indirect evidence. The direct evidence, ε d ∈ {1, 2}, is an informative but imperfect signal about the suspect's type. The direct evidence is either incriminating (ε d = 2), suggesting the suspect is guilty, or non-incriminating (ε d = 1), suggesting the suspect is either innocent or clearly innocent.
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Incriminating evidence might be an object or witness testimony that directly implicates the suspect in the crime. Let θ t ≡ Pr(ε d = 2| t)) be the probability that the jury observes incriminating evidence, conditional on the suspect's type. We assume that
That is, the direct evidence might incriminate the clearly innocent suspect or the innocent suspect, but is more likely to incriminate the guilty suspect.
The indirect evidence, ε i ∈ {v, nv}, is an informative but imperfect signal about the truthfulness of the suspect's period-1 statement, conditional on the suspect making such statement.
The indirect evidence either verifies (ε i = v) or contradicts (ε i = nv) the suspect's statement; it may consist, for example, of a witness testimony that affirms or refutes the suspect's alibi. Let δ t ≡ Pr(ε i = nv| t). be the probability that the indirect evidence contradicts the suspect's period-1 statement, conditional on the suspect's type. We assume that
That is, the indirect evidence never contradicts the clearly innocent suspect's statement and is more likely to contradict the innocent suspect's statement than the guilty suspect's statement. The indirect evidence might contradict the innocent suspect's statement because the police distort the suspect's statement or because the evidence at trial is not accurate; for example, a prosecution witness might give false testimony.
The evidence at trial is thus a pair (ε d , ε i ) ∈ 0, 1 × {v, nv}, if the suspect made a statement in period 1, and ε d ∈ 1, 2 if the suspect did not make such statement.
Pay-offs and Equilibrium
We normalize the suspect's payoff so that the suspect receives a payoff of 1 if acquitted, a payoff of 0 if convicted, and a payoff of 0 < u < 1 if he confesses the crime. We will refer to u as the 'confession premium.' It thus reflects the relative costs of Type I (wrongful conviction) versus Type II error (wrongful acquittal). We further assume that the jury's payoffs schedule reflects society's tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors. We thus rule out the case in which the jury's preferences diverge from society's.
The suspect's strategy in period 1 maps the suspect's type to a probability distribution over speech, silence, and confession. The jury's strategy consists of a belief and a corresponding action. The jury's belief,D, is a posterior estimate that the suspect is guilty, given the suspect's equilibrium strategy and the realization of the evidence; the jury's action is a probability of conviction. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (i) the suspect's strategy maximizes its payoff given the jury's equilibrium strategy; (ii) the jury's strategy maximizes its payoff given its posterior belief about the suspect's type; and (ii) the jury's belief is consistent with the suspect's equilibrium strategy and Bayes rule along the equilibrium path. 10 
Assumptions
We make the following assumptions about the jury's payoff-maximizing decisions given the suspect's strategy and the realization of the evidence.
A1. (probative value of the direct evidence)
.
A1 implies that, if all suspect types are silent and
That is, if all suspect types are silent, the jury maximizes its payoff by (i) always convicting the suspect if the direct evidence incriminates the suspect, and (ii) always acquitting the suspect if the direct evidence does not incriminate the suspect. A1 reflects the notion that the direct evidence in itself has probative value.
A2. (reasonable doubt)
A2 implies that, if the clearly innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak and
That is, if the suspect is either the clearly innocent suspect or the guilty suspect, the jury maximizes its payoff by always acquitting the suspect if the indirect evidence verifies the suspect's statement, irrespective of the realization of the direct evidence. A2 reflects the notion that if the indirect evidence does not rule out the possibility that the suspect is the clearly innocent suspect, the jury has a reasonable doubt about the suspect's guilt and therefore does not convict the suspect. It follows from A2 that the clearly innocent suspect can always exonerate himself by making a statement, as the indirect evidence always verifies his statement.
A3. (adverse inference)
A3 implies that, if the suspect is either the innocent suspect or the guilty suspect, then D > D for ε d = 1, 2. It follows from A3 that if the clearly innocent suspect always speaks, but the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always remain silent, the jury maximizes its payoff by always convicting a silent suspect, even if the direct evidence is not incriminating. We call this state of affairs "adverse inference from silence." A3 also implies that
; that is, if the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak and
We can now define a right to silence (RTS) as follows.
Definition 1. If suspects have RTS, then the jury may not convict a silent suspect in the absence of incriminating evidence.
Definition 1 implies that the jury may not draw an adverse inference from the suspect's silence; that is, to convict a silent suspect, the jury must observe incriminating evidence.
A4. (Confession Premium)
A4 is made for computational convenience and does not detract from the generality of our results. Following A4, we can restrict the analysis to the following cases:
From A1 (probative value of the direct evidence) and A2 (reasonable doubt) it follows that there does not exists an equilibrium in which all suspect types remain silent, for the clearly innocent suspect can exonerate himself with certainty by speaking but is convicted with positive probability if he remains silent. We will accordingly restrict the analysis to equilibria in which the clearly innocent suspect always speaks and thereby is exonerated with certainty. We proceed by defining the conditions under which a right to silence affects the equilibrium outcome.
Definition 2. Assume suspects have RTS. We say that RTS is 'effective' if, in equilibrium,
Definition 2 implies that suspects invoke their right to silence if, in equilibrium, the jury would maximize its payoff by always convicting a silent suspect, even in the absence of incriminating evidence. In particular, if a right to silence is effective, the equilibrium play of the game depends on whether or not a right to silence exists.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that a right to silence is effective. It follows from Definition 2 that if the suspect is silent and ε d = 2, thenD > D. The jury, therefore, maximizes its payoff by convicting a silent suspect if ε d = 2. This implies that the guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff from remaining silence is 1 − θ 2 . But if 1 − θ 2 < min{1 − δ 2 , u}, the guilty suspect could profitably deviate to speech or confession. Contradiction .
Following Lemma 1, we can restrict the analysis to two cases:
we will refer to this case as a 'low premium for confession'
we will refer to this case as a 'high premium for confession'
If the premium for confession is low, then in equilibrium no suspect confesses the crime. To see why, note that if the premium for confession is low, the guilty suspect's payoff from confession is lower than his payoff from speech; the guilty suspect, therefore, never confesses in equilibrium. Since the innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is always greater than the guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff, the innocent suspect never confesses as well. As we show in Section 5, when the premium for confession is high only the guilty suspect finds it profitable to confess in equilibrium.
No Right-to-Silence
In this section, we consider the case in which suspects do not have a right to silence and the premium for confession is low. In the absence of a right to silence, there does not exist a pooling equilibrium in which both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always remain silent, since, by A3 (adverse inference), the jury would draw an adverse inference of guilt from the suspect's silence (recall that the clearly innocent suspect always speaks in equilibrium). The guilty suspect could then exonerate himself with positive probability by making a statement, because the indirect evidence verifies his statement with positive probability and by A2 (reasonable doubt) the jury always acquits the suspect if the evidence verifies the suspect's statement.
There does not exist, moreover, a completely separating equilibrium in which the innocent suspect always speaks (remains silent) and the guilty suspect always remains silent (speaks), for the jury would always acquit a speaking (silent) suspect and always convict a silent (speaking) suspect. The guilty suspect could then profitably deviate to speech (silence), thereby exonerating himself with certainty. A similar argument rules out an equilibrium in which the innocent suspect mixes between silence and speech and the guilty suspect always remains silent.
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Two equilibrium candidates are left. In one equilibrium, both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak. In the other equilibrium, the innocent suspect always remains silent and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence.
Proposition 1 presents these equilibria. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that the innocent suspect always speaks if he is indifferent between speech and silence.
Proposition 1. (equilibrium strategies without RTS and low confession premium)
The following strategy profiles constitute the unique perfect Bayesian equilibria that survive the Universal Divinity refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987) .
: both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak. The jury always acquits the suspect if ε i = v and always convicts the suspect if
: the innocent suspect always remains silent, and the guilty suspect remains silent with probability Part (a) presents a pooling equilibrium in which both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak. If the indirect evidence verifies the suspect's statement, then by A2 (reasonable doubt) the jury acquits the suspect, even if the direct evidence incriminates the suspect; if the indirect evidence contradicts the suspect's statement, then by A3 (adverse inference) the jury convicts the suspect, even if the direct evidence does not incriminate the suspect. The jury's decision thus depends solely on the realization of the indirect evidence.
Part (b) presents a semi-pooling equilibrium in which the innocent suspect always remains silent and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence. The jury always convicts a silent suspect if the direct evidence incriminates the suspect and convicts a silent suspect with some positive probability lower than 1 if the direct evidence does not incriminate the suspect. This probability is such that the guilty suspect is indifferent between speech and silence and is sufficiently low that the innocent suspect prefers to remain silent than to speak. The guilty suspect's equilibrium probability of remaining silent, in turn, is such that the jury is indifferent between acquitting and convicting a silent suspect if the direct evidence is not incriminating.
To illustrate the equilibria without a right to silence, consider the following examples. The innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is equal to or is higher than 1−δ 2 , since the innocent suspect can always secure a payoff of 1 − δ 2 by speaking. Thus, the innocent suspect remains silent if and only if his payoff from silence is greater than 1 − δ 2 . The guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff is 1 − δ 2 since in any equilibrium he speaks with positive probability.
Example 1. (pooling equilibrium without RTS) If
θ 1 ≈ θ 2 (⇒ 1−θ 2 1−δ 2 > 1−θ 1 1−δ 1 ),δ 2 −θ 2 1−θ 2 ∈ (1 − δ 1 , 1) if
Right to Silence
In this section, we consider the case in which suspects have a right to silence. Recall that a right to silence prevents a jury from drawing an inference of guilt from the suspect's silence. Specifically, if the suspect remains silent, the jury must reach its verdict based solely on the presence or absence of incriminating evidence, rather than on the suspect's decision to remain silence.
As in the case in which suspects do not have a right to silence, there does not exist a completely separating equilibrium in which the innocent suspect always speaks (remains silent) and the guilty suspect always remains silent (speaks). In addition, that a right to silence is effective (i.e., δ 2 > θ 2 ) implies that there does not exist a pooling equilibrium in which both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak, for the guilty suspect could profitably deviate to silence. For the same reason, there does not exist a semi-pooling equilibrium in which the innocent suspect always remains silent and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence.
The presence of a right to silence, however, introduces two equilibria that are not present if suspects do not have a right to silence. In one equilibrium, both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always remain silent. (Recall that if suspects do not have a right to silence, the jury would draw an inference of guilt from silence, thereby inducing the guilty suspect to profitably deviate to speech). In the other equilibrium, the innocent suspect always speaks and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence. (Recall that if suspects do not have a right to silence, the jury would draw an inference of guilt from silence, thereby inducing the guilty suspect to profitably deviate to speech).
Proposition 2 presents these equilibria. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that the innocent suspect always speaks if he is indifferent between speech and silence.
Proposition 2. (equilibrium strategies with RTS and low confession premium)
The following strategy profiles constitute the unique perfect Bayesian equilibria that survive the Universal Divinity refinement. 
: the innocent suspect always speaks, and the guilty suspect speaks with probability Part (a) presents a pooling equilibrium in which both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect exercise the right to silence. Since suspects have a right to silence, the jury must acquit a silent suspect if the evidence does not incriminate the suspect, even though, by A3 (adverse inference) the jury would maximize its payoff by convicting a silent suspect. The jury thus convicts a silent suspect if and only if the direct evidence incriminates the suspect.
Part (b) presents a semi-pooling equilibrium in which only the guilty suspect exercises the right to silence; in the absence of a right to silence, the jury would draw an adverse inference from silence and would always convict a silent suspect. The jury convicts the suspect with positive probability lower than 1 if the direct evidence is non-incriminating and the indirect evidence contradicts the suspect's statement.
13
This probability is such that the guilty suspect is indifferent between speech and silence and is sufficiently low so that the innocent suspect prefers to speak than to remain silent. Note that, in contrast to the pooling equilibrium without a right to silence, the jury does not always convict a suspect whose statement is contradicted by the indirect evidence.
To illustrate the equilibria with a right to silence, consider the following examples.
Example 3. (pooling equilibrium with RTS)
If δ 1 ≈ δ 2 (⇒ 1−(θ 2 /δ 2 ) 1−θ 2 < 1−(θ 1 /δ 1 ) 1−θ 1
), then both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always remain silent. Intuitively, if the indirect evidence is not informative, the innocent suspect can best separate himself from the guilty suspect by always remaining silent.
Example 4. (semi-pooling equilibrium with RTS)
If θ 1 ≈ θ 2 (⇒ 1−(θ 2 /δ 2 ) 1−θ 2 > 1−(θ 1 /δ 1 ) 1−θ 1
), then the innocent suspect always speaks and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence. Intuitively, if the direct evidence is not informative, the innocent suspect can best separate himself from the guilty suspect by always speaking.
The next corollary considers the suspects' equilibrium payoffs if suspects have a right to silence.
Corrolary 2. (equilibrium payoffs with RTS and low confession premium) (a) The innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is
1 − δ 1 (θ 2 /δ 2 )−θ 2 1−θ 2 ∈ (max{1 − θ 1 , 1 − δ 1 }, 1
) if he always speaks and is 1 − θ 1 if he always remains silent. (b)The guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff is 1 − θ 2 irrespective of the equilibrium outcome.
The innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is equal to or is greater than 1 − θ 1 , since the innocent suspect can always secure a payoff of 1 − θ 1 by exercising his right to silence. Thus, the innocent suspect speaks if and only if his payoff from speech is greater than 1 − θ 1 .
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The guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff is 1 − θ 2 , since in any equilibrium in which a right to silence is effective the guilty suspect remains silent with positive probability. Proposition 3 considers the effect of a right to silence on the equilibrium strategies of the guilty suspect and/or the innocent suspect.
Proposition 3. (effects of RTS on equilibrium strategies with low confession premium) (a) if
, the innocent suspect always speaks with and without RTS; the guilty suspect always speaks without RTS and mixes between speech and silence with RTS.
, both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak without RTS, and always remain silent with RTS. (c) if
1−θ 2 1−δ 2 < 1−θ 1 1−δ 1
, the innocent suspect always remains silent with and without RTS; the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence without RTS and always remains silent with RTS. (d) if the innocent suspect always remains silent without RTS, then he also always remains silent with RTS (i.e., if
Part (a) presents the case in which a right to silence causes the guilty suspect to shift from always speaking to mixing between speech and silence, but does not alter the innocent suspect's equilibrium strategy of always speaking. This effect of a right to silence is the one identified by Seidmann and Stein (2000) . Here the innocent suspect indirectly benefits from a right to silence because the jury does not always convict a suspect if the indirect evidence contradicts the suspect's statement, as in the case where suspects do not have a right to silence. Part (b) presents the case in which a right to silence causes both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect to shift from always speaking to always remaining silent. Here the innocent suspect directly benefits from a right to silence, because his equilibrium payoff if he remains silent in the presence of a right to silence (1 − θ 1 ) is higher than if he speaks in the absence of a right to silence (1 − δ 1 ).
Part (c) presents the case in which a right to silence causes the guilty suspect to shift from mixing between silence and speech to always remaining silent, but does not alter the innocent suspect's equilibrium strategy of always remaining silent. Although the innocent suspect always remains silent irrespective of whether a right to silence exists, the innocent suspect directly benefits from a right to silence, because a right prohibits the jury from convicting a silent suspect if the evidence is not incriminating. In the absence of a right to silence, by contrast, the innocent suspect is convicted with some positive probability when he remains silent if the direct evidence is not incriminating.
Part (d) implies that a right to silence never causes suspects to shift from silence to speech. Thus, the introduction of a right to silence always lowers the incidence of police statements.
To illustrate the effects of a right to silence on the equilibrium strategies, consider the following examples. 
), then the innocent suspect always speaks with and without RTS; the guilty suspect always speaks without RTS and mixes between speech and silence with RTS.
Example 6. if δ 1 ≈ δ 2 (⇒ 1−θ 2 1−δ 2 < 1−θ 1 1−δ 1 , 1−(θ 2 /δ 2 ) 1−θ 2 < 1−(θ 1 /δ 1 ) 1−θ 1 , θ 1 δ 1 < 1),
), then both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak without RTS and always remain silent with RTS.
The next corollary considers the effects of a right to silence on the innocent suspect's, the guilty suspect's, and the jury's equilibrium payoff.
Corrolary 3. (equilibrium payoffs with and without RTS) (a) Both the innocent suspect's and the guilty suspects' equilibrium payoff is higher with RTS than without RTS. In particular: (i) If the innocent suspect always speaks with and without RTS, then his gain from RTS is
(
ii) If the innocent suspect always speaks with RTS, but always remains silent with RTS, then his gain from RTS is δ
1 − θ 1 .
(iii) If the innocent suspect always remains silent irrespective of whether suspects have a right to silence, then his gain from RTS is
(iv) Irrespective of the equilibrium outcome, the guilty suspect's gain from RTS is δ 2 − θ 2 .
(b) The jury's equilibrium payoff is higher without RTS than with RTS.
Although both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect benefit from a right to silence, the jury's equilibrium payoff is always lower if suspects have a right to silence. This holds for any effect that a right to silence might have on suspects' equilibrium strategies. The intuition for this result, as pointed out by Seidmann (2005) , is that a commitment to ignore information cannot make the jury better off. A right to silence may nevertheless be justified as a means of enhancing the protection given to innocent suspects. 15 To see that δ 1 ≈ δ 2 implies
Adding δ+θ 2 θ 1 to both sides yields δ−θ 2 −δθ 1 +θ 2 θ 1 < δ −θ 1 −δθ 2 +θ 2 θ 1 . This can be rewritten as (δ−θ 2 )(1−θ 1 ) < (δ−θ 1 )(1−θ 2 ). Dividing through by (1−θ 1 )(1−θ 2 ) gives
Finally, multiplying through by 1/δ we get
High Premium for Confession
In this section, we consider the case in which the premium for confession is sufficiently high so that the guilty suspect may confess in equilibrium. We maintain the assumption that a right to silence is effective. Specifically, we assume that
Proposition 4 presents the equilibrium outcomes when suspects do not have a right to silence and the premium for confession is high. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that the innocent suspect speaks if he is indifferent between speech and silence.
Proposition 4(1). (equilibrium strategies without RTS and a high confession premium)
The following strategy profiles is the unique Perfect Bayesian equilibria that survive the Universal Divinity refinement.
(a) If
: the innocent suspect always speaks, and the guilty suspect speaks with probability
and confesses with the complementary probability. The jury always convicts the suspect if ε i = nv and ε d = 2. The jury convicts the suspect with probability
and acquits the suspect with the complementary probability if ε i = nv and ε d = 1.
The jury always acquits the suspect if
: the innocent suspect always remains silent, and the guilty suspect remains silent with probability When the premium for confession is high, the guilty suspect always confesses with some positive probability lower than 1. Whether the guilty suspect speaks or remains silent depends on the innocent's suspect equilibrium strategy. Thus, the equilibrium in part (a) is a semipooling equilibrium in which the innocent suspect always speaks and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and confession. The equilibrium in Part (b) is a semi-pooling equilibrium in which the innocent suspect always remains silent and the guilty suspect mixes between silence and confession. Note that, the innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is higher as compared to the case in which the premium for confession is low.
Proposition 4(2). equilibrium strategies with RTS and a high confession premium If suspects have a right to silence, then the equilibrium play is not affected by the premium for confession.
The rationale for Proposition 4(2) is straightforward. If the premium for confession is high and a right to silence is effective (1 − θ 2 > u > 1 − δ 2 ), the guilty suspect obtains a higher payoff from exercising his right to silence and remaining silent than from confessing. Accordingly, the guilty suspect never has incentives to confess the crime. The equilibrium outcomes are thus identical to the case in which the premium for confession is low (1 − θ 2 > 1 − δ 2 > u).
Proposition 4(3). (effects of RTS on the equilibrium strategies with high confession premium) (a) If
: the innocent suspect always speaks with and without RTS; the guilty suspect mixes between speech and confession without RTS and mixes between speech and silence with RTS.
: the innocent suspect always speaks without RTS and always remains silent with RTS; the guilty suspect mixes between speech and confession without RTS and always remains silent with RTS. (c) If
, the innocent suspect always remains silent with and without RTS; the guilty suspect mixes between silence and confession without RTS and always remains silent with RTS. 16 
. (d) If the innocent suspect always remains silent with RTS, then he also always remains silent with RTS (i.e., if
Part (a) presents the case in which a right to silence causes the guilty suspect to shift from mixing between speech and confession to mixing between speech and silence, but does not alter the innocent suspect's strategy of always speaking. Although the innocent suspect's strategy is not affected by the presence of a right to silence, the innocent suspect directly benefits from a right to silence because the jury convicts a suspect whose statement is contradicted by the evidence with lower probability if suspects have a right to silence. Part (b) presents the case in which a right to silence induces the innocent suspect to shift from always speaking to always remaining silent and induces the guilty suspect to shift from mixing between speech and confession to always remaining silent. In this equilibrium, the innocent suspect directly benefits from a right to silence because his equilibrium payoff when he remains silent in the presence of a right to silence is higher than his equilibrium payoff when he speaks in the absence of a right to silence.
Part (c) presents the case in which a right to silence induces the guilty suspect to shift from mixing between silence and confession to always remaining silent, but does not alter the innocent suspect's strategy of always remaining silent. Although the innocent suspect's strategy is not affected by the presence of a right to silence, the innocent suspect directly benefits from a right to silence because the right prohibits the jury from convicting a silent suspect if the evidence is not 16 If
incriminating. In the absence of a right to silence, by contrast, the innocent suspect is convicted with positive probability when he remains silent even if the evidence is not incriminating.
Note that in all cases in which a right to silence alters the equilibrium outcome, it also reduces the equilibrium probability of confession.
Part (d) states that if the innocent suspect always remains silent in the absence of a right to silence, he also always remains silent in the presence of a right to silence (the reverse is not true). Thus, as in the case in which the premium for confession is low, a right to silence never causes suspects to shift from silence to speech. A right to silence may only cause suspects to shift from speech to silence or from confession to silence.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a model that examines the effects of a right to silence on innocent and guilty suspects' decisions to speak or to remain silent. We show that a right to silence benefits innocent suspects by inducing them to shift from speech to silence, thereby providing them with a safer alternative to speech. Moreover, a right to silence benefits innocent suspects even if it does not alter their decision to speak or to remain silent. Specifically, a right to silence decreases the probability of wrongful conviction of innocent suspects who always remain silent or always speak irrespective of whether a right to silence exists. The paper thus provides a broad utilitarian basis for the argument that the right to silence helps the innocent. Proof. We will proceed by showing that the innocent suspect, the guilty suspect, and the jury cannot profitably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. We will then show that this equilibrium is unique.
Given that the jury always convicts a silent suspect, neither the innocent suspect nor the guilty suspect can profitably deviate to silence. Given that both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect speak, the jury maximizes its payoff by convicting the suspect if ε i = nv for ε d = 1, 2(by A2), and by acquitting the suspect if
To show uniqueness, observe that the only other equilibrium candidate is one in which the innocent suspect always remains silent and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence. For the guilty suspect to be indifferent between speech and silence, the jury must convict a silent suspect if ε d = 2, convict a silent suspect with probability
and acquit such suspect with the complementary probability if ε d = 1 (since then the guilty suspect's payoff from remaining silent is (1 − θ 2 )(
In this putative equilibrium, the innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is (1 − θ 2 )
. Thus, the innocent suspect can profitably deviate to speech.
17
. This, in turn, upsets the proposed equilibrium.
Proposition 1(b). (no RTS and low premium for confession)
, the following strategy profiles is the unique PBE of the game that survives the Universal Divinity refinement: the innocent suspect always remains silent and the guilty suspect remains silent with probability
and speaks with the complementary probability. The jury always convicts a silent suspect if ε d = 2, convicts a silent suspect with probability Proof. We will proceed by showing that the innocent suspect, the guilty suspect, and the jury cannot profitably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. Then, using the Universal Divinity refinement, we will show that this equilibrium is unique.
The innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is (1−θ 1 )(1−
). By deviating to speech, the innocent suspect obtains 1 − δ 1 , the probability with which the indirect evidence verifies his statement. But
Thus, the innocent suspect cannot profitably deviate to speech. Given the jury's equilibrium strategy, the guilty suspect's payoff from always speaking is 1 − δ 2 , the probability with which the indirect evidence verifies his statement; the guilty suspect's payoff from always remaining silent is
Thus, the guilty suspect is indifferent between speech and silence. In particular, remaining silent with probability
is a best response (although not uniquely).
By Bayes' rule, if the suspect is silent and
It follows that the jury is indifferent between acquitting and convicting a silent suspect if ε d = 1. In particular, convicting the suspect with probability
is a best response (although not uniquely). In addition, the jury maximizes its payoff by always convicting the suspect if ε i = nv for ε d = 1, 2 (by A2), and by always acquitting the suspect if
To show uniqueness, observe that in the only other equilibrium candidate both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always speak. To support this equilibrium, the jury's out-ofequilibrium beliefs must be that if the suspect is silent, thenD ≥ D, for ε d = 1, 2. We will show, however, that the jury's out-of-equilibrium beliefs do not survive the Universal Divinity refinement.
First, note that θ 2 < δ 2 and
imply θ 1 < δ 1 . Let q t , t = 1, 2, denote the probability with which the jury must convict a silent suspect if ε d = 1 so that suspect t = 1, 2 is indifferent between speech and silence. q t therefore solves
The set of jury's responses for which deviation to silence is profitable is thus larger for the innocent suspect than the guilty suspect. The jury must therefore believe that deviation to silence comes from the innocent suspect and accordingly acquit a silent suspect. This in turn upsets the proposed equilibrium. Proof. We will show that the innocent suspect, the guilty suspect, and the jury cannot profitably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. We will then show that this equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 2(a). (RTS and low premium for confession)
The innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is 1 − θ 1 . By deviating to speech, the innocent suspect obtains 1 − δ 1 , the probability the direct evidence is not incriminating. But δ 2 > θ 2 and
The innocent suspect therefore cannot profitably deviate to speech. The guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff is 1 − θ 2 . By deviating to speech, the guilty suspect obtains 1 − δ 2 , the probability that the indirect evidence verifies his statement. Since 1 − θ 2 > 1 − δ 2 , the guilty suspect cannot profitably deviate to speech.
To show uniqueness, observe that in the only other equilibrium candidate, the innocent suspect always speaks and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and silence. To support this equilibrium, the jury must convict the suspect if ε i = nv and ε d = 1 with probability q 2 so as to make the guilty suspect indifferent between speech and silence. q 2 must therefore satisfy
. This implies that, in this putative equilibrium, the innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is
. But
Thus, the innocent suspect can profitably deviate to silence.
Proposition 2(b). (RTS and low premium for confession)
, the following strategy profile is the unique PBE that survives the Universal Divinity refinement. The innocent suspect always speaks, and the guilty suspect speaks with probability Proof. We will show that the innocent suspect, the guilty suspect, and the jury cannot profitably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. We will then show that this equilibrium is unique.
The innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is
). By deviating to silence, the innocent suspect obtains 1 − θ 1 , the probability with which the direct evidence is not incriminating. But
Thus, the innocent suspect cannot profitably deviate to silence. The guilty suspect's equilibrium payoff is
The guilty suspect is thus indifferent between speech and silence.
In particular, speaking with probability
By Bayes rule, the probability the suspect is guilty given ε i = nv and
It follows that the jury is indifferent between acquitting and convicting the suspect if ε i = nv and ε d = 1. In particular, convicting the suspect with probability
To show uniqueness, observe that the only other equilibrium candidate is one in which both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect always remain silent. To support this equilibrium, the jury's out-of-equilibrium beliefs must be that if ε i = nv, thenD ≥ D for ε d = 1, 2. We will show, however, that the jury's out-of-equilibrium beliefs do not survive the Universal Divinity refinement.
First, assume θ 1 > δ 1 . Then, the innocent suspect, but not the guilty suspect, finds it profitable to deviate to speech, even if the jury always convicts the suspect if ε i = nv for ε d = 1, 2 (since θ 2 < δ 2 ). Thus, the jury must believe that deviation to speech comes from the innocent suspect; accordingly, the jury always acquits a speaking, thereby inducing both the innocent suspect and the guilty suspect to deviate to speech.
Next, assume that θ 1 ≤ δ 1 . Let q t denote the probability with which the jury convicts the suspect if ε i = nv and ε d = 1 so that suspect t = 1, 2 is indifferent between silence and speech.
The jury must therefore believe that deviation to speech comes from the innocent suspect and always acquit a speaking suspect. This, in turn, upsets the proposed equilibrium.
Proposition 3(d). if the innocent suspect always remains silent without RTS, then he also always remains silent with RTS (i.e., if
Proof. Note that
. Rearranging terms we get
, it follows that
. This, in turn, implies
Corollary 3(b). (Jury's equilibrium payoff)
The jury equilibrium payoff is higher without RTS than with RTS.
Proof. Case (i):
: The jury's equilibrium payoff in a pooling equilibrium without RTS is −[ (1 − D) ]. The jury's equilibrium payoff in a semi-pooling equilibrium with RTS is −{p 1 
Case (ii):
: The jury's equilibrium payoff in a pooling equilibrium without RTS is −[p 1 δ 1 D+p 2 (1−δ 2 ) (1−D) ]. The jury's equilibrium payoff in a pooling equilibrium with RTS is −[p 1 θ 1 D + p 2 (1 − θ 2 )(1 − D) ]. Subtracting the latter expression from the former gives −[p 1 
(by A2) and Proof. We first prove that the innocent suspect, the guilty suspect, and the jury cannot profitably deviate from their equilibrium strategies. We will then show that this equilibrium is unique.
Given the jury's equilibrium strategy, the innocent suspect's equilibrium payoff is (1−θ 1 )
. By deviating to confession, the innocent suspect obtains u. But θ 1 < θ 2 implies > u. Thus the innocent suspect cannot profitably deviate to confession. Given the jury's equilibrium strategy, the guilty suspect's payoff from silence is (1 − θ 2 ) u 1−θ 2 = u. 18 To see why, recall that the jury always convicts the suspect if ε i = nv and ε d = 2 and is indifferent between acquitting and convicting the suspect if ε i = nv and ε d = 1. We can thus assume the jury always convicts the suspect if ε i = nv, for ε d = 1, 2.
19 to see why, recall that the jury is indifferent between acquitting and convicting a silent suspect if ε d = 1. We can thus assume the jury always acquits a silent suspect if ε d = 1.
The guilty suspect is thus indifferent between silence and confession. In particular, remaining silent with probability
By Bayes rule, The probability that a silent suspect is guilty given that ε d = 1 isD = p 2 (1 − θ 2 )
The jury is thus indifferent between acquitting and convicting a silent suspect if ε d = 1. In particular, convicting the suspect with probability 1 − u 1−θ 2 is a best response (although not uniquely).
To show uniqueness, observe that in the only other equilibrium candidate, the innocent suspect always speaks and the guilty suspect mixes between speech and confession. To support this equilibrium, the jury's out-of-equilibrium beliefs must be that if the silent is suspect, thenD ≥ D, for ε d = 1, 2. We will show, however, that the jury's out-of-equilibrium beliefs do not survive the Universal Divinity refinement.
Let q t denote the probability with which the jury convicts a silent suspect if ε d = 1 so that suspect t = 1, 2 is indifferent between his equilibrium strategy and silence. Notice that (i) q 2 > 0 (since δ 2 > θ 2 ), and that (ii) if δ 1 < θ 1 , then q 1 = 0. Thus, if δ 1 < θ 1 , q 2 > q 1 . , and thus q 1 =
= q 2 . The jury must therefore believe that deviation to silence comes from the innocent suspect; accordingly, the jury must always acquit a silent suspect. This, in turn, upsets the proposed equilibrium. . Rewriting this inequality we get
. Multiplying the right-hand side by 
